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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
by Mary F. Radford*
This Article describes the significant Georgia cases and legislation
from the period of June 1, 2006 through May 31, 2007 that pertain to
Georgia fiduciary law and estate planning. Specifically, this Article
covers cases and legislation on matters relating to wills, trusts, the
administration of decedents' estates, and the guardianship and
conservatorship of minors and incapacitated adults.
I.

A.

SIGNIFICANT GEORGIA CASES

Right of Parent to Inherit from Child

As described later in this Article, in 2007 the Georgia inheritance laws
were amended to prohibit a parent who has abandoned a minor child
from inheriting any portion of that child's estate.' Prior to the enactment of this amendment to the inheritance laws, the Georgia Court of
Appeals decided two relevant cases: Blackstone v. Blackstone2 and
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University School of Law (J.D., 1981). Member, State Bar of Georgia. Reporter, Probate
Code Revision Committee, Guardianship Code Revision Committee, and Trust Code
Revision Committee of the Fiduciary Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia. Academic
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AND
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ed.

2000);

GUARDIANSHIPS

AND

CONSERVATORSHIPS IN GEORGIA (2005).

1. See discussion infra Part II.A. As noted in that section, if an individual dies without
a valid will (intestate) and is not survived by a spouse, a child, or any other descendants,
the parents of that individual are entitled to share the individual's estate. O.C.G.A. § 53-21(c)(4) (Supp. 2007); see also 1 MARY F. RADFORD, REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
IN GEORGIA § 9-1, at 246 (6th ed. 2000).
2. 282 Ga. App. 515, 639 S.E.2d 369 (2006).
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Baker v. Sweat.' In Blackstone the question raised was whether a
father who had abused and neglected his child could still recover as the
sole heir of the child's estate. The decedent, Corey Blackstone, was
killed by a drunk driver at age twenty-four. The only assets that would
be in Corey's estate were any potential damages for pain and suffering
recovered in legal actions against the driver who had caused Corey's
death.4 Corey had no spouse or children and his mother had predeceased him, and therefore Corey's father, Cal, stood to inherit Corey's
entire estate.5 Cal had been incarcerated throughout most of Corey's
life and had abused his wife and his children. Corey and his twin
brother went to live with Cal when they were fifteen years old, but the
Department of Family and Children's Services stepped in within a few
months and took custody of the children. The juvenile court later placed
Corey into an older brother's custody. Cal never appealed these actions.
Importantly, even though the court deprived Cal of custody and parental
power over Corey, Cal's parental rights were never formally terminated;
consequently, Cal's inheritance rights remained intact.6 The trial court
granted summary judgment against the father, but the court of appeals
ruled that Cal could inherit his son's estate.7

3. 281 Ga. App. 863, 637 S.E.2d 474 (2006).
4. Blackstone, 282 Ga. App. at 516, 639 S.E.2d at 370. An action for pain and suffering
belongs to the decedent, and the decedent's death prior to the commencement of the action
does not cause the action to abate. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-41 (2007). Instead, the decedent's
personal representative will bring the action on behalf of the decedent and the proceeds are
paid to the decedent's estate. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 51-4-5 (2000); see Complete Auto Transit v.
Floyd, 214 Ga. 232, 237-38, 104 S.E.2d 208, 213 (1958); Grant v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 239 Ga.
App. 748, 750-51, 521 S.E.2d 868, 870 (1999); Smith v. Meml Med. Ctr., Inc., 208 Ga. App.
26, 27-28, 430 S.E.2d 57, 58-59 (1993); Walden v. John D. Archbold Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 197
Ga. App. 275, 277, 398 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1990). On the other hand, recovery for wrongful
death belongs not to the estate but to the persons who are authorized by statute to bring
the action. O.C.G.A. sections 19-7-1 and 51-4-4 provide that the surviving parents of a
child may bring an action for the homicide of the child. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (Supp. 2007);
O.C.G.A. § 51-4-4 (2000).
5. Blackstone, 282 Ga. App. at 516-17,639 S.E.2d at 370-71; see O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1(c)(4).
6. Blackstone, 282 Ga. App. at 516-17, 639 S.E.2d at 370-71. Georgia law expressly
provides that an order terminating parental rights permanently terminates all of a parent's
rights relating to the child, including the right of inheritance. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-93 (2005).
In Taylor v. Taylor, 280 Ga. 88, 623 S.E.2d 477 (2005), the Georgia Supreme Court had
confirmed that the loss of parental power is not the equivalent of a termination of parental
rights. Id. at 91, 623 S.E.2d at 479 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
7. Blackstone, 282 Ga. App. at 517, 639 S.E.2d at 371. The trial court relied on In re
Estate of Lunsford, 610 S.E.2d 366 (N.C. 2005), a North Carolina case which interpreted
a North Carolina statute that specifically provided that a parent would lose inheritance
rights in such a situation. Id. at 373.
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In the month prior to the issuance of the court of appeals decision in
Blackstone, the court of appeals decided Baker v.Sweat." In Baker the
court held that a father who had never supported or attempted to
establish a relationship with his child lacked standing to pursue a
wrongful death action for the death of the child.9 The difference
between the holdings of these two cases revolves around an interplay
between the wrongful death statute and the loss of parental power
statute, an interplay that is not replicated in the inheritance statute.
According to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section
51-4-4,1° the right to recover for the wrongful death of a child "shall be

as provided in Code Section 19-7-1."" Although O.C.G.A. section 19-7112 deals with loss of parental power and wrongful death recovery
rights, it does not expressly provide that a parent who has abandoned
a child loses the right to pursue a wrongful death action.' 3 The section
does provide that a parent who abandons the child loses parental
power.' 4 Based on this code section the court of appeals concluded that
abandonment of a child and the loss of wrongful death recovery rights
were closely intertwined. 5 However, in Blackstone the court determined that there was no such cross-reference in the inheritance
statute.' 6 Furthermore, the court pointed to its holding in a previous
case that O.C.G.A. section 19-7-1 must be strictly construed, and thus
the court refused to expand the reasoning of that statute to cover
inheritance situations. 7 Because the later-described 2007 amendment
to the inheritance laws applies to abandonment but not abuse, and
because it applies only if the child was still a minor when he or she died,
that amendment, had it been in effect, would not have prevented Mr.
Blackstone from inheriting from his son.' 8

8. 281 Ga. App. 863, 637 S.E.2d 474 (2006).
9. Id. at 863-64, 637 S.E.2d at 475. As noted supra note 4, a cause of action and any
recovery for the wrongful death of a child belongs directly to the surviving parent, not to
the child's estate.
10. O.C.G.A. § 51-4-4 (2000).
11. Id.
12. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (Supp. 2007).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 19-7-1(b)(3).
15. Baker, 281 Ga. App. at 867, 637 S.E.2d at 478. The court of appeals had held in
past cases that a parent who abandons a child forfeits his or her right to share in the
recovery for the child's wrongful death. Dove v. Carver, 197 Ga. App. 733, 735, 399 S.E.2d
216,218-19 (1990); Ramos v. Ramos, 173 Ga. App. 30,31-33,325 S.E.2d 415,417-19 (1984).
16. 282 Ga. App. at 517-18, 639 S.E.2d at 371-72.
17. Id. (citing Tolbert v. Maner, 271 Ga. 207, 208, 518 S.E.2d 423, 424 (1999)).
18. See Ga. H.R. Bill 139, § 2, Reg. Sess. (2007); O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1 (Supp. 2007).
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Will Execution Requirements

Georgia law contains specific requirements that must be met for a will
to be deemed validly executed and attested. According to O.C.G.A.
section 53-4-20(b), 9 two witnesses are required to sign the will in the
presence of the testator.2 ° In McCormick v. Jeffers,2 1 the Georgia
Supreme Court examined the meaning of the term "presence."22 The
testator in this case signed her will in the presence of two witnesses and
a notary public while seated in a chair in her bedroom. The witnesses
and notary public then took the will into the dining room, where they
signed it. From her chair in her bedroom, the testator was unable to see
the witnesses as they signed the will.23 The Georgia Supreme Court
concluded that the will had not been properly attested because the
witnesses had not signed the will in the testator's presence.24 The
court applied the "line of vision" test to determine whether the witnesses
were in the testator's presence.25 Under this test, the testator must
have been able to see the witnesses if she had looked. 26 The court
refused to apply the less stringent "conscious presence" test that is used
in some other jurisdictions.27 The court noted that Georgia's Revised
Probate Code of 1998 had not included the term "conscious" in the
statute that required the witnesses' presence but instead had carried
forward the terminology used in the predecessor Probate Code.28 The
court noted that under the pre-1998 Probate Code, it had interpreted the
term presence under the line of vision test.29 The court concluded that
it did not have the authority
to expand the statute to encompass the
30
conscious presence test.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

O.C.G.A. § 53-4-20(b) (1997).
Id.
281 Ga. 264, 637 S.E.2d 666 (2006).
Id. at 266-67, 637 S.E.2d at 669-70.
Id. at 265, 637 S.E.2d at 668.
Id.
Id. at 266, 637 S.E.2d at 669.
Id.
Id. at 266-67, 637 S.E.2d at 669. Under the conscious presence test, the presence

requirement is satisfied if the testator can sense the presence of the witness, for example,
by hearing the witness. Id. The testator need not see the witness under this test. Id.
28. Id. at 267, 637 S.E.2d at 669.
29.
30.

Id.

Id.
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C. Lack of Capacity and Undue Influence
The Georgia appellate courts continue to face appeals of cases in which
a transferor of property (whether by deed or by will) is alleged to have
been of a weakened mental capacity3 ' and to have succumbed to the
undue influence of a third party.3 2 The Georgia appellate courts
discussed these issues in six cases that were decided during the 20062007 reporting period.33 Although the decisions in these cases are
peculiar to the facts of those cases, the appellate courts' discussions of
the factors examined on appeal are enlightening but, at times, also
confusing.
1. Undue Influence. The major topic on which the courts continue
to provoke more questions than answers is the topic concerning which
factors will give rise to a presumption of undue influence. 4 Georgia
statutory law requires that a will be "freely and voluntarily executed"
and provides that a will is invalid "if anything destroys the testator's
freedom of volition, such as ... undue influence whereby the will of

another is substituted for the wishes of the testator."35 While the party
who alleges undue influence has the burden of proving it, a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence may arise if certain factors are
shown." In prior cases, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that this
presumption arises if some combination of the following three factors
exists: 1) there is a confidential relationship3 7 between the transferor
and the beneficiary, 2) the beneficiary is not a natural object of the

31. See RADFORD, WILLS & ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, §§ 4-2 to -5 (discussing
testamentary capacity).
32. See id. § 4-8 (discussing undue influence).
33. Lillard v. Owens, 281 Ga. 619, 641 S.E.2d 511 (2007); Smith v. Smith, 281 Ga. 380,
637 S.E.2d 632 (2006); King v. Brown, 280 Ga. 747, 632 S.E.2d 638 (2006); Pope v.
McWilliams, 280 Ga. 741, 632 S.E.2d 640 (2006); Smith v. Liney, 280 Ga. 600, 631 S.E.2d
648 (2006); Chesser v. Chesser, 284 Ga. App. 381, 643 S.E.2d 764 (2007).
34. See, e.g., Pope, 280 Ga. 741, 632 S.E.2d 640; Liney, 280 Ga. 600, 631 S.E.2d 648.
35. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-12 (1997).
36. See Bryan v. Norton, 245 Ga. 347, 348, 265 S.E.2d 282, 283 (1980).
37. According to O.C.G.A. section 23-2-58, a confidential relationship is defined as
follows:
Any relationship shall be deemed confidential, whether arising from nature,
created by law, or resulting from contracts, where one party is so situated as to
exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or
where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the
utmost good faith, such as the relationship between partners, principal and agent,
etc.
O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58 (1982).
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transferor's bounty, and 3) the beneficiary takes an active part in the
procurement of the will or other instrument of transfer.38 However, the
supreme court has vacillated about whether all three of the components
are necessary. For example, in White v. Regions Bank,3 9 the court
required only the existence of a confidential relationship,4 ° whereas in
41
Harper v. Harper,
the court stated that the existence of a confidential
relationship alone did not raise the presumption.4 2
In Bryan u.
Norton4 and Andrews v. Rentz," the court required two of the three
factors to raise the presumption of undue influence: a confidential
relationship
and the active participation by the beneficiary in procuring
45
the will.
The Georgia Supreme Court again discussed which factors give rise to
the presumption of undue influence during the 2006-2007 reporting
period in Smith v. Liney46 and Pope v. McWilliams.4 7 In Liney a
mother had left the bulk of her estate to her daughter and had only left
a few personal items to her son. The son claimed that his sister had
unduly influenced his mother.4' The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's finding that the will was not the product of undue influence.4 9
In its opinion, the supreme court did not discuss whether a confidential
relationship existed between the mother and the daughter.50 Instead,
the court determined that the daughter was the natural object of the
mother's bounty and had not actively participated in the preparation and
execution of the will.5 ' Thus, the court held a presumption of undue
influence did not arise.52

38. See, e.g., Bailey v. Edmondson, 280 Ga. 528, 529, 630 S.E.2d 396, 398 (2006);
McConnell v. Moore, 267 Ga. 839, 839-40, 483 S.E.2d 578, 579 (1997).
39. 275 Ga. 38, 561 S.E.2d 806 (2002).
40. Id. at 40, 561 S.E.2d at 808.
41. 274 Ga. 542, 554 S.E.2d 454 (2001).
42. Id. at 544, 554 S.E.2d at 456. White and Harper are discussed in Mary F. Radford,
Wills, Trusts & Administration of Estates, 54 MERCER L. REV. 583, 588-92 (2002).
43. 245 Ga. 347, 265 S.E.2d 282 (1980).
44. 266 Ga. 782, 470 S.E.2d 669 (1996).
45. Id. at 783-84, 470 S.E.2d at 671; Bryan, 245 Ga. at 348, 265 S.E.2d at 283.
46. 280 Ga. 600, 631 S.E.2d 648 (2006).
47. 280 Ga. 741, 632 S.E.2d 640 (2006).
48. Liney, 280 Ga. at 600, 631 S.E.2d at 648.
49. Id. at 600-01, 631 S.E.2d at 648-49. The jury could not reach a verdict at trial, so
the trial judge granted the daughter's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Id.
50. See id. at 600-02, 631 S.E.2d at 648-49.
51. Id. at 601-02, 631 S.E.2d at 649.
52. Id.
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Pope was handed down by the Georgia Supreme Court a month after
the decision in Liney.53 Pope concerned a challenge by the testator's
nephew who claimed that the testator's sister had exerted undue
influence on the testator, causing the testator to write a will that left the
bulk of his estate to his sister.54 In this case, the court cited all three
of the undue influence factors.55 The court determined that the sister
had not actively participated in the preparation of the will, that she was
an object of the testator's bounty, and that their relationship was not a
confidential relationship but rather, was one of mutual trust.5" Thus,
while it remains clear that these three factors are components of a
presumption of undue influence, it is still unclear what combination of
these factors must be present in a particular case.
2. Lack of Capacity. Georgia law requires that an adult be of a
certain mental state in order for a transfer of property by that adult to
be valid. 7 "Testamentary capacity," or the capacity to make a will,
"exists when the testator has a decided and rational desire as to the
disposition of property.""
Although Georgia case law indicates that
making a deed requires a higher level of capacity than that required to
make a will, 9 the case law describes the capacity to make a deed in
similar terms to that of testamentary capacity.60 Four cases that were

53. Liney was handed down by the supreme court on June 12, 2006. Pope was handed
down on July 13, 2006.
54. 280 Ga. at 742, 632 S.E.2d at 642.
55. Id. at 743-44, 632 S.E.2d at 642-43.
56. Id., 632 S.E.2d at 643. The court defined a confidential relationship as
"one where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the
will, conduct, and interest of another. Evidence showing only that the deceased
placed a general trust and confidence in the primary beneficiary is not sufficient
to trigger the rebuttable presumption that undue influence was exercised .... In
order to give rise to the rebuttable presumption .... the evidence must show a
confidential relationship wherein the primary beneficiary was capable of exerting
the power of leadership over the submissive testator."
Id. at 744, 632 S.E.2d at 643 (alterations in original) (quoting Holland v. Holland, 277 Ga.
792, 793-94, 596 S.E.2d 123, 126 (2004)).
57. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-11 (1997).
58. Id. § 53-4-11(a).
59. See Joiner v. Joiner, 225 Ga. 699, 703, 171 S.E.2d 297, 300 (1969).
60. See, e.g., Thomas v. Lockwood, 198 Ga. 437, 448-49, 31 S.E.2d 791, 798 (1944). The
court in Thomas approved the following jury instruction on the capacity to make a deed:
"If one should have mind and reason sufficient to have a decided and rational
desire as to what disposition he wishes to make of his property and to clearly
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his act in making a
deed of gift and he should make such a deed of conveyance of his property, having
at the time such decided and rational desire to do so, and mind and reason to
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decided during the 2006-2007 reporting period emphasize the importance
of the observations of medical personnel in helping the fact-finder
determine whether a transferor had legal capacity."
In King v. Brown,6 2 the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a jury finding
that a testator's will was invalid." The testator was suffering from
dementia, and as evidence of his weakened mental state, the court cited
to the testimony and medical records of a psychiatrist.6 4
In Lillard v. Owens, 65 the supreme court considered the evidence of

a hospice worker who had seen the testator two days before the will was
executed and had noted the testator's confusion and forgetfulness in the
hospice records.66 The court also pointed out that a pharmacological
expert had testified that someone taking the combination
6 7 of drugs that
the testator was taking "'would not be rationally sane.' ,
In Smith v. Smith,68 a case concerning the capacity to make a deed,
the supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that the transferor
lacked capacity and considered the evidence given by four witnesses, all
of whom were registered nurses who had provided care for the transferor.69 The court stated that these nurses were qualified to give expert

testimony regarding matters within their own expertise as well as to
give factual testimony regarding their observations of the transferor. °
Finally, in Chesser v.Chesser,7' the court of appeals considered two
competing doctors' assessments of the transferor's mental state.7 2 Two
days after the transferor executed the deed in question, her own doctor
declared in writing that she was "'mentally competent to manage her

clearly understand that the nature of his act was to execute a deed to his property
and that the consequence of his act was to divest it in another, he would be
capable of making a deed of gift under the laws of this State though he might not
have had a greater mental capacity than that."
Id.
61. Lillard v. Owens, 281 Ga. 619, 641 S.E.2d 511 (2007); Smith v. Smith, 281 Ga. 380,
637 S.E.2d 662 (2006); King v. Brown, 280 Ga. 747, 632 S.E.2d 638 (2006); Chesser v.
Chesser, 284 Ga. App. 381, 643 S.E.2d 764 (2007).
62. 280 Ga. 747, 632 S.E.2d 638 (2006).
63. Id. at 747-49, 632 S.E.2d at 639-40.
64. Id. at 748, 632 S.E.2d at 639. Other witnesses also testified that the testator
exhibited symptoms associated with dementia. Id.
65. 281 Ga. 619, 641 S.E.2d 511 (2007).
66. Id. at 620-21, 641 S.E.2d at 513.
67. Id. at 620, 641 S.E.2d at 513.
68. 281 Ga. 380, 637 S.E.2d 662 (2006).
69. Id. at 382, 637 S.E.2d at 664.
70. Id.
71. 284 Ga. App. 381, 643 S.E.2d 764 (2007).
72. Id. at 382-83, 643 S.E.2d at 765-66.
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own affairs."'73 Less than a month later, a court-appointed psychiatrist, who had evaluated the transferor after her son filed a petition to
be appointed her guardian and conservator, reported to the court that
74
the transferor was suffering from dementia and was incapacitated.
The court of appeals concluded that the evidence given by the transferor's doctor about her mental state soon after she executed the deed was
sufficient to support the trial court's verdict that the deed was valid.75
D. Standing to Sue
Last year this Author reported the decision of the Georgia Court of
Appeals in Morgan v. Johns.76 That case involved causes of action that
were brought in the probate court and superior court by the children of
a testator who had disinherited them in favor of his caretaker, Morgan.
On the day that the testator died, he transferred to Morgan a check for
$734,250, which the testator had received from the sale of some of his
real property. Morgan deposited the check that same afternoon, a few
hours before the testator died. When Morgan sought to have the
testator's will admitted to probate, the children filed a caveat to the
probate proceeding. They also filed a complaint in the superior court in
which they alleged fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty, and
they sought to have the superior court enjoin Morgan from spending or
transferring the money she had received from the testator.7 7 The
superior court granted the injunction, but the court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals refused to accept the children's argument that they were persons who were "'interested in the estate"' and
thus had standing to seek the intervention of the equity court under
O.C.G.A. section 23-2-91. 79 The court of appeals stated that the
children had no interest in the estate unless and until the probate court
determined that the testator's will was not valid." At the time the
children filed their claim in the superior court, the court of appeals held

73. Id. at 382, 643 S.E.2d at 765.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 383, 643 S.E.2d at 765-66.
76. 276 Ga. App. 366, 623 S.E.2d 219 (2005), rev'd, 281 Ga. 51, 635 S.E.2d 753 (2006).
The decision of the court of appeals was discussed in Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts,
Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration, 58 MERCER L. REV. 423, 436-38 (2006).
77. Morgan, 276 Ga. App. at 367, 623 S.E.2d at 220.
78. Id. at 369, 623 S.E.2d at 221.
79. Id. at 367,369, 623 S.E.2d at 220,221 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 23-2-91(1982)); O.C.G.A.
§ 23-2-91 (1982).

80. Morgan, 276 Ga. App. at 369, 623 S.E.2d at 221.
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that the children had nothing more than an "'expected inheritance."''
In October 2006 the supreme court reversed the holding of the court of
appeals.82 The supreme court held that "[c]ertainly, a superior court
may become involved in matters relating to the administration of estates
where there is a danger of loss or other injury to a party's interest, or
where equitable interference is required for the complete protection of
the rights of the parties in interest." 3
E.

Attorney Liability to Third Party for Negligent Drafting of a Will

Can a lawyer who drafts a will for a testator ever be held liable by a
third party who does not receive what the testator intended her to
receive under the will? Until 2007, Georgia case law contained no
8
definitive answer to this question. 4
In Young v. Williams,"
the
Georgia Court of Appeals allowed a third party to recover against a
lawyer in a legal malpractice claim in which the third party was clearly
intended to be a third-party beneficiary of the lawyer-client contractual
arrangement, and it was also clear that the lawyer's lack of care was the
proximate cause of the damages to the third party.8 6 The testator,
Williams, hired Young to draft his will. 7 After conversations with
Williams, Young drafted a will that left $250,000 and other personal
property to Betsy, Williams's second wife, and the remainder of the
testator's personal property to his children from his first marriage. The
will contained no residuary clause and apparently no clause relating to
real property.8 When Young and Williams were reviewing the will
together, Young commented that he was surprised that Betsy was not
getting more from Williams's estate, to which Williams responded that
she was getting "'a million dollar house free and clear.'" 89 When
Williams died, however, because his real property was not disposed of by

81. Id. at 368-69, 623 S.E.2d at 221 (quoting Julian v. Brooks, 269 Ga. 167, 167, 495
S.E.2d 569, 569 (1998)).
82. Johns v. Morgan, 281 Ga. 51, 54, 635 S.E.2d 753, 756 (2006).
83. Id., 635 S.E.2d at 755.
84. For a discussion of cases relevant to this issue, see RADFORD, WILLS & ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, § 4-11.
85. 285 Ga. App. 208, 645 S.E.2d 624 (2007).
86. Id. at 210, 645 S.E.2d at 626.
87. Id. at 209, 645 S.E.2d at 625. There was no written contract between the lawyer
and his client, such as an engagement letter, but the court was satisfied that the lawyer's
testimony made the parameters of their agreement quite clear. Id. at 209-10, 645 S.E.2d
at 625-26.
88. See id. at 208-10, 645 S.E.2d at 625-26.
89. Id. at 210, 645 S.E.2d at 625.
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his will, the house passed by intestacy, one-third to Betsy and the
remaining two-thirds to his children.9"
Generally speaking, "To support a claim for legal malpractice, [the
plaintiff] must show that (1) he or she employed the attorney; (2) the
attorney failed to exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence; and (3)
such negligence proximately caused the [plaintiff] damages." 91 In
Young the attorney did not deny that Williams had made it clear that
he intended for Betsy to have his residence after his death. The
attorney also testified that he had violated his own standard of care by
omitting a residuary clause. 92 However, he asserted that Betsy could
not sue him for malpractice because no attorney-client relationship
(privity of contract) had existed between him and Betsy.93 The trial
court granted partial summary judgment for Betsy on this issue, and the
court of appeals affirmed.94 The court of appeals cited Georgia cases
dealing with real property and corporate transactions for its conclusion
that, although a malpractice suit is generally inappropriate if there is no
attorney-client relationship, there can be situations in which a nonclient
can sue as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the attorney
and his or her actual client.9 5 This type of malpractice action will only
be allowed if the contract was clearly intended for the nonclient's
benefit. 96 The court of appeals held that Young had been hired to write
a will that would benefit the testator's wife, Betsy, and that "in drafting
a will, he owed to the intended beneficiaries a duty similar to the duty
he owed the testator in making sure the testator's intent is carried
out."97 The court of appeals also addressed Young's assertion that
Betsy had not proven that his negligence was the proximate cause of any

90. Id. at 208-09, 645 S.E.2d at 625. According to O.C.G.A. section 53-2-1(c)(1), a
decedent's estate will be divided equally among the decedent's surviving spouse and
children but the spouse will not take less than a one-third share. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1(c)(1)
(Supp. 2007) (formerly O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (1997)).
91. Graivier v. Dreger & McClelland, 280 Ga. App. 74, 76-77, 633 S.E.2d 406, 410
(2006).
92. Young, 285 Ga. App. at 210, 645 S.E.2d at 625-26. An expert witness also testified
by affidavit that omitting a residuary clause was a violation of the standard of care
required of attorneys. Id.
93. Id., 645 S.E.2d at 626.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 209, 645 S.E.2d 625 (citing Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 502, 224 S.E.2d
370, 372-73 (1976); Graivier,280 Ga. App. at 76, 633 S.E.2d at 409; Legacy Homes, Inc. v.
Cole, 205 Ga. App. 34, 35, 421 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1992); Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849,
852, 227 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1976)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 210, 645 S.E.2d at 626.
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damage to her.9" The court of appeals held that his negligence clearly
resulted in her losing the two-thirds interest in the home. 99 Finally,
the court pointed out that the fact that Williams had read the will before
signing it did not insulate Young from liability for Young's negligence.100

II.
A.

2007 LEGISLATION

Parent Prohibitedfrom Inheritingfrom Abandoned Child

The rules for the distribution of an estate that apply when the
decedent has died intestate (that is, without a valid will) are contained
in O.C.G.A. section 53-2-1.1' If an individual dies intestate and is not
survived by a spouse, a child, or any other descendants, the parents of
that individual are entitled to share the individual's estate.' 2 This
rule was amended in 2007103 to prohibit a parent from inheriting from
a minor child 0 4 if the parent has "willfully abandoned" the child.'0 5
In such a case, the parent is also prohibited from acting as the personal
representative of the child's estate. 106 A parent willfully abandons a
child if the parent "without justifiable cause, fails to communicate with
the minor child, care for the minor child, and provide for the minor
child's support as required by law or judicial decree for a period of at
least one year immediately prior to the date of the death of the
minor.," 1 7 The abandonment must be proven by the person asserting
it by clear and convincing evidence at a hearing conducted for that
purpose.' 8 If a parent lost custody due to a court order but substantially complied with the support requirements of that order, the parent

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1 (Supp. 2007). These rules are described in detail in RADFORD,
WILLS & ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, §§ 9-1 to -9.
102. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1(c)(4). The inheritance rights of the parents of a child who was
born out of wedlock are set forth in O.C.G.A. section 53-2-4. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-4 (Supp.
2007).
103. Ga. H.R. Bill 139, § 2, Reg. Sess. (2007).
104. A minor child is defined as a child who is under age eighteen. O.C.G.A. § 53-21(a)(2). The prohibition against inheritance seems to apply only if the child is still a minor
when the child dies. Id. § 53-2-1(d).
105. Id. § 53-2-1(d). If the parent cannot inherit due to this prohibition, the parent's
share of the minor's estate will be distributed as if the parent had predeceased the minor
child. Id. § 53-2-1(g).
106. Id. § 53-2-1(d).
107. Id. § 53-2-1(a)(1)(A).
108. Id. § 53-2-1(e).
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may inherit from the minor in the event of the child's death.0 9 This
amendment does not apply to recovery by a parent in a wrongful death
suit. That situation is dealt with separately in O.C.G.A. section 51-44.110

B.

GeorgiaAdvance Directive for Health Care

Georgia law allows an individual to plan ahead for health care
decision-making in the event that individual loses the capacity to make
those important decisions for himself or herself. Typically, lawyers have
recommended that clients execute one or both of two documents: a living
will and a durable health care power of attorney. A living will is
designed solely for the purpose of allowing the individual to direct what,
if any, measures should be taken in the end stages of a terminal
condition or if that individual is in a state of permanent unconsciousness.'
The durable health care power of attorney allows an individual to appoint an agent to make health care decisions for him or her if he
or she is not able to do so." 2 Prior to the 2007 legislation, the O.C.G.A. provided statutory forms for both of these documents. 113 In 2007
the Georgia legislature enacted the Georgia Advance Directive for Health
Care Act (the "Act")."' This Act gives individuals a suggested form,
called an "advance directive for health care," that combines the two
documents described above into one document and expands the possible
treatment options that an individual can choose in his or her directive."' The Act became effective July 1, 2007, and does not affect or
invalidate living wills, durable health care powers of attorney, or other
similar documents executed before that date, unless such documents are
revoked or replaced by the new form."'

109. Id. § 53-2-1(d).
110. O.C.G.A. § 51-4-4 (2000). For a description of two recent cases that distinguish
between a parent's right to inherit from a child's estate and a parent's right to recover for
the wrongful death of a child, see supra text accompanying notes 1-18.
111. Prior to the 2007 legislation, the laws relating to living wills appeared at Chapter
32 of Title 31 of the O.C.G.A.
112. Prior to the 2007 legislation, the laws relating to health care powers of attorney
appeared at Chapter 36 of Title 31 of the O.C.G.A.
113. The statutory form for the living will appeared at O.C.G.A. section 31-32-3.
O.C.G.A. § 31-32-3 (2006). The statutory form for the health care power of attorney
appeared at O.C.G.A. section 31-36-10. O.C.G.A. § 31-36-10 (2006).
114. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, § 2, Reg. Sess. (2007). This Act is found in Chapter 32 of Title
31 of the O.C.G.A.
115. The new advance directive form is contained in O.C.G.A. section 31-32-4. O.C.G.A.
§ 31-32-4 (Supp. 2007).
116. O.C.G.A. § 31-32-3 (Supp. 2007).
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The
There are four parts to the advance directive document.'
declarant"' need not complete all four parts.1 9 For example, Part
One will be20effective even if Parts Two or Three are not completed and

vice versa.

Part One allows the declarant to appoint a health care agent and one
or more back-up agents.' 2 ' Part One lists the powers of the health
care agent and includes the appointment of the agent as the declarant's
representative for laws relating to medical privacy, including the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.122 This part also
makes it clear that the agent cannot make health care decisions
regarding psychosurgery, sterilization, or treatment or involuntary
hospitalization for mental illness, mental retardation, or addiction. 123
The form specifically states that the agent may accompany the declarant
in an ambulance or air ambulance and visit the declarant in a hospital
or other health care facility, if the protocol of that facility permits
visitation. 24 Part One directs the health care agent to look to Part
Two, which is entitled "Treatment Preferences, " 125 for guidance in

making decisions, and to consider the declarant's previous statements,
health care actions, religious and other beliefs, and values. 26 If after
this consideration it remains unclear what the declarant would do in a
particular situation, then the agent is to make a decision that is in the
declarant's best interest, "considering the benefits, burdens, and risks of
[the declarant's] current circumstances and treatment options." 27 Part
One allows the declarant to give the agent the authority to make post-

117. O.C.G.A. § 31-32-4.
118. A declarant is any person of sound mind who is at least age eighteen or
emancipated. O.C.G.A. § 31-32-5(a) (Supp. 2007).
119. O.C.G.A. § 31-32-4.
120. Id.
121. O.C.G.A. § 31-32-4, pt. One(l), (2). This part points out that a physician or other
health care provider who is directly involved in the declarant's health care may not serve
as the agent, nor may an ex-spouse. Marriage after the directive has been signed will
revoke the appointment of the agent unless the agent is the declarant's new spouse. Id.
§ 31-32-4, pt. One.
122. Id. § 31-32-4, pt. One(3); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and
42 U.S.C.).
123. O.C.G.A. § 31-32-4, pt. One.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 31-32-4, pt. Two.
126. Id. § 31-32-4, pt. One(4).
127. Id.
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death decisions about autopsies and disposition of the declarant's organs
or entire body, including organ donations.128
Part Two of the advance directive for health care form replaces the
former "living will" form. If this part is completed, it is only effective if
the declarant is unable to communicate his or her own wishes. 129 As
well, Part Two applies only if the declarant is in a "terminal condition"130 or a "state of permanent unconsciousness." 3 ' Part Two gives
the declarant three options for treatment.'32
The first option is
extension of life as long as possible using medications, machines, and
other medical procedures.' 33 This option makes it clear that nutrition
and fluids by tube or other means are to be continued. 34 The second
option is allowing a natural death without medications, machines, and
procedures when the only purpose is to prolong life. 135 This option
makes it clear that nutrition and hydration by tube or other means are
not to be continued unless needed to provide pain medication. 36 The
third option is allowing the declarant to choose which procedures should
be continued. 137 The choices (any or all of which may be chosen) are
the following: nutrition, fluids, ventilator, and cardio-pulmonary
3
resuscitation. 8
Part Two also allows the declarant the option to make additional
statements to provide guidance concerning his or her treatment
preferences. 39 Part Two provides that it will be effective when the
declarant is pregnant only if the declarant initials a statement that says:
"I want PART TWO to be carried out if my fetus is not viable." 4 °

128. Id. § 31-32-4, pt. One(5).
129. Id. § 31-32-4, pt. Two. The introduction to this part makes clear that if a health
care agent has been appointed, the agent may be guided by the preferences stated in Part
Two, but the agent retains the ultimate authority to make all health care decisions. Id.
130. Id. § 31-32-4, pt. Two(6). A terminal condition is defined as "an incurable or
irreversible condition that will result in ... death in a relatively short period of time." Id.
131. Id.
A state of permanent unconsciousness is defined as "an incurable or
irreversible condition in which I am not aware of myself or my environment and I show no
behavioral response to my environment." Id.
132. Id. § 31-32-4, pt. Two(7).
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 31-32-4, pt. Two(8).
140. Id. § 31-32-4, pt. Two(9).
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Part Three of the advance directive form allows the declarant to
nominate an individual to serve as his or her guardian. 4 1 Under
O.C.G.A. section 29-4-3,'42 the probate court may not override that
designation in a guardianship proceeding without good cause. 143 This
to choose the health care agent or any other
part allows the declarant
14 4
individual as guardian.
Part Four, which is entitled "Effectiveness and Signatures," must be
completed for the advance directive to be valid. 145 Part Four clarifies
that this document revokes any other advance directive, health care
power of attorney, or living will made by the declarant. 14' This part
makes the directive effective on the date of execution unless the
declarant provides an alternative effective date or event.'4 7 Part Four
requires the document to be signed or acknowledged in the presence of
two witnesses who are at least eighteen years old; however, the
not have to be in each other's presence when they sign the
witnesses do
48
document. 1
An advance directive may be revoked by a new form, which revokes
the older document expressly or by inconsistency, by being destroyed
(burned, torn, or obliterated), by a written revocation, or by an oral or
As noted above, marriage revokes the
other clear expression. 149
designation of anyone as health care agent other than the individual
who becomes the declarant's spouse. 5 ° The appointment of a guardian
or receiver for the declarant does not revoke the advance directive, and
the agent's authority will supersede that of the guardian on all matters
covered by the advance directive.'

Id. § 31-32-4, pt. Three.
O.C.G.A. § 29-4-3 (2007).
This provision of the Georgia Guardianship Code is discussed in MARY F.
RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS IN GEORGIA § 4-5, at 199 (2005).
144. O.C.G.A. § 31-32-4, pt. Three(10).
145. Id. § 31-32-4, pt. Four.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Part Four states that the following cannot serve as witnesses: a) the health
care agent, b) a person who will inherit from or gain any other financial benefit due to the
declarant's death, or c) a person who is directly involved in the declarant's health care. Id.
Also, only one of the witnesses may be an employee, agent, or medical staff member of the
facility if the declarant is receiving health care from a facility at the time of the execution
of the document. Id.
149. O.C.G.A. § 31-32-6(a) (Supp. 2007).
150. Id. § 31-32-6(b).
151. Id. § 31-32-6(c). The issue of medical consents for individuals for whom a guardian
has been appointed is discussed in detail in RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS, supra note 143, § 4-7, at 213.
141.
142.
143.

